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This paper draws on the concept of affect in the writings of Deleuze (via Spinoza), and 
Simondon, to develop an ontogenetic version of psychology. The value of this approach 
is its focus on becoming rather than form, which makes it well placed to navigate the 
specific conditions of the genesis of human activity in contemporary socio-technical 
worlds. Psychology can then be thought of as emerging through processes of movement 
and transformation that simultaneously grow “from the inside and the outside” 
(Deleuze, 2001: 45). A psychology of this kind can potentially open up to the ideas of 
distributed agency that have emerged from critical theory in recent years (e.g. Galloway 
& Thacker, 2007). For example, the view that human capacities (e.g. cognition) are 
increasingly operating as much through technology as human brains, presenting new 
ontological questions (Hayles, 2012). Often, the focus has been on cognition and digital 
media, although that is changing now towards greater critical theory regarding digital 
media and emotion (Sampson, 2017). In this paper I seek to address these questions 
through the work of Gilbert Simondon, who offers a concept of affectivity that helps to 
theoretically isolate the genesis of individual activity without becoming trapped by the 
idea of a finished product. This speaks to the role of emotion and affect in contemporary 
socio-technical worlds, as core processes through which psychological experience 
manifests.  
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There have been multiple attempts to define a ‘relational’ approach to psychology since 
the emergence of critical psychology. While diverse in approach, there has been a 
shared concern to avoid reductionism and essentialism, and to emphasise the ‘social’ 
shaping of psychological experience (see Teo, 2014 for a comprehensive overview). 
Approaches have often coalesced around certain concepts, such as discourse, 
embodiment and more recently, affect; as well as specific theorists (e.g. Foucault). The 
challenge has always been to present a coherent relational approach that challenges the 
thinking of much mainstream cognitive theory, while avoiding essentialism or 
reductionism (e.g. through an over reliance on discourse). Indeed, we have often been 
compelled to start ‘in the middle’ (Brown and Stenner, 2009), wherever the middle may 
be. This emergence in critical psychology is both a contribution to, and reflection of, a 
wider move of non-essentialist thinking across the social sciences (and beyond). 
Although diverse in approach, a shared concern has featured to view the world as 
constantly ‘in-making’ in and through multiple relations and connections. This has led to 
the current popularity of concepts such as assemblage (e.g. Sampson, 2017) and 
meshwork (Ingold, 2015). Viewing any one element as dominant or primary has been 
viewed as a mistake of a lot of mainstream positivist theory, although examples of less 
reductionist theory in so-called mainstream thinking have existed for some time. For 
instance, Ulrich Neisser’s early cognitive psychology, in which he states “[M]any 
cognitive phenomena are incomprehensible unless one takes some account of what the 
subject is trying to do” (1967: 5); an early steer towards a ‘situated cognition’. There is 
also Andy Clark’s and David Chalmers’ (1998) ‘extended mind’ thesis in philosophy, as 
well as the rise of epigenetics (Blackman, 2016). Nonetheless, a movement towards 
relationality has emerged, premised on the idea that psychological categories (e.g. 
emotion, memory) do not pertain to individual entities but rather that such experiences 
only exist within relations to others (humans and non-humans) (Despret, 2004).  
Relational approaches therefore require a shift in the psychological unit of analysis, 
through expanding beyond the traditional ‘internal’ locations of mind and brain to wider 
ecological contexts in which individual and social life emerge and unfold. A distinction 
between essentialism and constructionism has often featured as a jumping off point for 
critical psychological approaches, with the latter primarily focusing on the role of 
discourse as constituting the social (Blackman, 2008). Relationality has been seen as a 
way to move beyond essentialist theories of the psychological, with new theories of 
embodiment, sensation, memory, space and affect emerging (Teo, 2014). Hence, 
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multiple theories of relationality have come to populate critical psychology (Tucker, 
2006).  
In this article, I develop a theory of the psychological subject informed by a particular 
conceptualisation of affect, drawing upon Spinoza, Deleuze and Simondon. Deleuze has 
featured extensively in social and cultural theory in the previous 20 years, although not 
so much in psychology (Nichterlein & Morss, 2017 being a valuable corrective). Gilbert 
Simondon has been far less used, although that is starting to change (Tucker, 2013; 
Tucker & Goodings, 2014). I will argue that potentially valuable lessons can be learnt 
through a Spinoza-Deleuze-Simondon journey, in relation to psychology, with specific 
reference to the socio-technical challenges of contemporary life. Studies of affect are 
not a new area, with a plethora of new theoretical offerings emerging in recent times. 
Indeed, Seigworth & Gregg name a “by no means fully comprehensive” (2010: 8) eight 
distinct strands of affect theory in the social sciences and cultural studies. I will focus on 
the area of digitality and emotion because of the increasing number of voices in 
academia, industry and beyond that claim that emotions and affect are becoming more 
accessible to (and potentially manipulated by) digital technologies, and as such, are 
deemed to be an example of the ways that human life is under threat from machines 
(McStay, 2016). I will not claim a new singular identity for affect; a new improved 
version. My aim is, following Deleuze, to use the concept to start a journey, focused on 
its becoming than being. Despite uses of affect being diffuse and diverse (Blackman, 
2012; Hemmings, 2005), I argue it does provide a direction to theoretical attempts to 
render psychological life in contemporary socio-technical worlds sensible. 
 
Thinking affect with Deleuze and Spinoza 
Deleuze’s approach to affect is heavily indebted to Spinoza. Indeed, such was Spinoza’s 
influence on Deleuze that the latter wrote two books on Spinoza’s philosophy (which 
broke his habit of single monographs on key influences, e.g. Bergson, Hume). It was 
Spinoza’s monism that was the initial draw, a non-hylomorphic approach of all life 
existing as a single substance, from which an infinite number of attributes could emerge. 
This means that no two ‘things’ can be ontologically distinguished according to species 
or form. The all-encompassing substance Spinoza thought of as God or Nature. With his 
monist philosophy human beings are actualised attributes from infinite possible 
attributes. Spinoza’s affect is immediately relational, as it renders a body 
incomprehensible without reference to another body. What a body does is implicitly 
related to the connection(s) it has with other bodies. Spinoza envisaged a parallelism 
between bodies and ideas. This was part of his rebuttal of the privilege Cartesianism 
gives to the ‘rational’ cogito. For Spinoza, ideas are not cognitive representations of 
body states, making cognition somehow superior due to it being the realm of knowledge 
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about the body. Instead, neither bodies nor ideas are considered as reducible to each 
other. They operate as parallel processes in which ideas emerge as part of a wider set of 
ordering relations (Brown and Stenner, 2009), with affect registering ideas as patterns 
of embodied movement and rest (Smith and Tucker, 2015).  
Deleuze’s definition of bodies according to degrees of longitude and latitude comes from 
Spinoza’s invitation to consider bodies (and ideas) in divergent horizontal and vertical 
directions. The former conveys the relation of bodies and ideas which unite through 
commonality across the two attributes, and the latter as expressions of the totality of 
God/Nature as unifying substance (Gatens and Lloyd, 1999). There are two vectors 
through which the body-idea parallelism operates, one in relation to the wider system 
of substance, and an ‘internal’ one between body and idea as attributes. The dual vector 
model operates through relations that are ‘alive’, in terms of existing only as movements 
that result in modifications of bodies and ideas. It is affect that registers modifications, 
and can then in turn speak to the formation of individual emotional experience. Affects 
are broadly characterised according to a continuum between relational modifications 
that emerge as joyful, and those that produce sadness (Deleuze, 1992). This is where 
the common take on Spinoza’s affect as indicating either an increase or decrease in a 
body’s capacity to act (with the former as joyful, and the latter as sad). This is quite a 
crude characterisation, but can be made more sophisticated through focus on 
commonly experienced emotions, which Brown and Stenner (2009) demonstrate very 
well. An example would be the expression of anxiety in relation to an upcoming hospital 
appointment in which major surgery as a possible outcome hinges on the results of a 
series of tests. If the test results are positive, surgery can be avoided, and the body will 
not suffer a diminution of capacity. If results are negative, surgery and a loss of power 
will occur. The experience of emotion felt by the patient is relational, it is the 
consequence of the result of the test. Moreover, it is also temporal. If the next time a 
test is due it demonstrates that surgery has been successful, the emotional response to 
the test and the consultation shifts from negative to positive.  
Spinoza’s analysis of affect speaks valuably to a relational non-bifurcated approach. This 
is based on a logic that affect operates through a parallel process of ideas and bodies, 
as part of a broader network, or assemblage of activity. This encourages an extended 
view of psychology, which does not limit the location of psychological processes to 
interiority. Extended versions of psychology have become popular in relation to the 
increased presence of technology in modern life. For instance, the notion of distributed 
(or situated) cognition claims an extension of psychological processes beyond the 
individual (brain) to the technical operation of computers, which are subsequently 
imbued with agency in relation to psychological elements such as thinking, decision 
making and memory. Hutchins’ (1995) ‘situated cognition’ is a good example of this, 
which he uses to develop a computational model of ship navigation, where the ‘thinking’ 
Annual Review of Critical Psychology 14 (2018) 131 
 
operates through a system composed of individual navigators and an array of 
navigational equipment: 
If we ascribe to individual minds in isolation the properties of 
systems that are actually composed of individuals manipulating 
systems of cultural artefacts, then we have attributed to individual 
minds a process that they do not necessarily have, and we have 
failed to ask about the processes they actually must have in order 
to manipulate the artefacts. This sort of attribution is a serious but 
frequently committed error. (Hutchins, 1995: 173) 
Hutchins's point is not to claim that all thinking occurs ‘within’ the individual, but rather 
to understand how thinking (as computation) is distributed across individuals and 
technologies. Distributed cognition has gained traction because it is encapsulated within 
the idea that as technologies become more sophisticated, they develop agency in 
relation to psychological functions and processes. It also helps that it connects with the 
computational model that has dominated cognitive psychology since the second half of 
the 20th century.  
Deleuze’s concept of affect offers an alternative relational approach as it does not draw 
on a computational approach to psychology (Brown & Stenner, 2001; Tucker, 2012). 
Instead, it places psychological experience on a continuum, extending from the brain, to 
the body, to other bodies (human and non-human). Deleuze’s affect stimulates us to 
consider any part of this continuum to be potentially affective and therefore register as 
psychological. Moreover, Deleuze (with Guattari) defines the body as “[N]othing but 
affects and local movement” (1987: 287). Thinking a body in a given situation requires 
analysing the “sum total of the material elements belonging to it under given relations 
of movement and rest, speed and slowness (longitude); the sum total of the intensive 
affects it is capable of at a given power or degree or potential (latitude)” (ibid). Deleuze 
tends to think in terms of affect, rather than cognition, although an underlying 
relationality exists with both.  
Relations are defined temporally, in terms of movement and rest, and spatially in terms 
of the capacities of bodies to affect others. There is an obvious value to this relational 
notion of affect, but it speaks directly to the ways that a body’s actions and experiences 
depend on the movement of power in the material contexts within which everyday life 
unfolds. The importance of motion in the concept of affect in Spinoza and Deleuze 
directs us to consider life as emerging through rhythms and speeds of movement in 
contemporary socio-technical worlds. As Duclos et al (2017) recently point out, digitally-
mediated cultures are subject to new speeds and accelerations. The version of affect 
developing here is one that is inherently relational and motional. It does not though 
speak directly to the role of technics in society. The rise of digitality in recent years has 
directed considerable attention to technologies, and their relationships to humans. This 
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question leads us directly to the work of Simondon, who was an important influence on 
Deleuze, and for whom, technics was a central philosophical concern.  
 
Simondon and individuation 
Simondon argues that by better understanding our relationship 
with the technical objects fashioned to regulate our existence in the 
world, we create for ourselves the possibility of a new idea of what 
it means to be human, on the basis of a knowledge that correlates 
technologies with human processes of existence. Human reality 
lives through technologies. (Scott, 2014: 1)  
David Scott captures how prominent a role technologies play in Simondon’s thinking, 
and indeed Simondon was a key influence on philosophies of technology (e.g. Stiegler). 
Simondon’s ontogenetic approach to individuation was developed in relation to 
technological objects and living beings (including a specific focus on psychology). 
Although writing to a pre-digital world, his philosophy speaks directly to living in digitally 
mediated environments. If it was a viable claim that humanity ‘lives through 
technologies’ in pre-digital age, it is an even more prescient comment on the 
information saturated environments of modern life. Simondon’s focus on technical 
objects came from a perceived need to emphasise their role in culture, and not just as 
the primary view of them as passive tools for human use. Technics and culture cannot 
be separated for Simondon, and as such, we need to find a way to explain their 
interwoveness. Simondon was writing largely in an analogue age, with his examples 
often related to engineering (e.g. Guimbal turbine). He was focused on developing an 
onto-genetic approach to claim that technical objects do not exist as examples of some 
kind of inherent form, i.e. machines are not, in and of themselves, the originators of 
their functions. Instead, they emerge as a 'solution' to a problem. Moreover, the genesis 
of a technical object does not involve 'new' elements, but rather a new 'coming together' 
of existing elements. For instance, a brick emerges from the elements of clay, mould and 
a kiln. All pre-existed the brick. Moreover, the 'brickness' of the brick does not emanate 
from the brick itself, in terms of being inherent to that object, but emerges through a 
process of the coming together of the clay, mould and kiln for a specific function, e.g. 
construction. The perceived ‘brickness’ is not necessarily permanent as the brick could 
in the future be broken into small pieces to form rubble.  
It was in On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects that Simondon (2017) introduced 
his ideas regarding individuation. He was though a psychologist by training, and indeed, 
taught in psychology, not philosophy, as many of his philosophical contemporaries did 
(e.g. Deleuze). Simondon’s focus on the individuation of technical objects extended to a 
study of human psychology in his later work, Psychic and Collective Individuation. The 
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same principles apply, namely that psychological life is not determined by a set of 
inherent properties but emerges in and through individuations that are simultaneously 
individual and collective. Simondon always starts 'in the middle', arguing that an 
ontogenetic approach is required based on the principle of individuation, in which the 
genesis, and ongoing life, of living beings emerges in and through a broader set of 
relations. Simondon sums this up as the need to place "the individual into the system of 
reality in which the individuation occurs" (2009: 4). When Simondon talks about the 
genesis of psychic and collective individuation, he is not distinguishing two forms of 
individuation, but rather one form that is “psychic and collective, or to put it another 
way, psychosocial” (Combes, 2013: 31). The emphasis is on the process of individuation, 
rather than individual and collective as defined entities. As Simondon notes, “[S]trictly 
speaking, we cannot speak of the individual, but only of individuation; we must get back 
to the activity, to genesis, rather than trying to grasp the already given being in order to 
discover the criteria by which we can know whether or not it is an individual. The 
individual is not a being but an act” (cited in Barthelemy, 2015: 26). Psychic and 
collective individuation emerges through the "division of being" into phases (Simondon, 
2009: 6). A distinction is made between becoming and being, with psychic and collective 
individuation existing as phases of becoming, and the realm of preindividuation as non-
phased being. It is the phasing of life that catalyses processes of individuation (which is 
what makes Simondon’s a relational and processual philosophy). This process of phasing 
occurs unequivocally through environment-body relations that Simondon frames as 
associated milieus. 
 
Individuation and associated milieus 
The unit of analysis in Simondon's psycho-social approach becomes the milieu, which 
names the localised environmental context through which individuation takes place.51 
The milieu is not just seen as the wider system of affordance (as per Eleanor Gibson’s 
(1969) and James Gibson’s (1979) ecological psychology), but rather as a permanent 
companion to the living being. The milieu is a way to condition a future of possible 
change and transformation. Similarities exist with Anderson’s (2009) conceptualisation 
of affective atmospheres as impersonal aspects of collective situations, which also 
manage to feel intensely personal. The notion of milieu develops this through requiring 
specific attention to individual-environment relations, and what new milieus (or 
potential/s for affective experience) are made possible. Milieus direct us towards 
thinking about experience in the making, as in-formed rather than pre-formed.  
                                                     
51 The concept of milieu can be traced back to Jacob von Uexküll’s (2010) thinking regarding the relation/s 
between animals and environment – see Brown (this volume) for a discussion of von Uexküll and critical 
psychology. 
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Simondon's concept of associated milieu can localise the notion of atmospheres in such 
a way that directs attention to the specificity of individuation. It also resonates with the 
concept of assemblage, which has featured heavily in the social sciences and cultural 
studies (DeLanda, 2006; Sampson, 2017). Although broad in use, assemblage theory has 
been recruited to analyse the ways that entities operate as a set of elements, whose 
relations do not operate in terms of an internal logic. The entity as a whole does not 
retain the identifying structure of its composite elements (DeLanda, 2006). Indeed, 
assemblages have been framed as the coming together of heterogeneous elements to 
form entities ranging from biological organisms to socio-political orders (Sampson, 
2017). The concept of assemblage has often been associated with Deleuze & Guattari, 
and while they did discuss a concept of assemblage, its use across the social sciences 
and cultural theory cannot be reduced entirely to their reading. Indeed, Deleuze & 
Guattari’s mentions of assemblage were quite small in number, even if it is said to relate 
to other parts of his conceptual work, e.g. content and expression, deterritorialisation 
(DeLanda, 2006). The focus on heterogeneity in the form of indeterminacy and spatial 
and temporal contingency links to the principles underpinning the associated milieu, 
despite assemblage theory being criticised for inadequately conceptualising motion 
(Ingold, 2015). Simondon’s attention was directed to the context in and through which 
individuation emerged (whether in relation to technical or psychic objects) and was 
more localised than many theories of assemblage. Indeed, theories of assemblage do 
not share the focus on individuation.  
Associated milieus are taken as always-already motional, even if the movement relates 
to an individual’s ongoing interaction with its milieu, meaning that a sense of stability in 
the expression of individuation is possible (Clough, 2010). For instance, the individuation 
of a brick through the 'coming together' of unformed clay and a brick mould. For 
Simondon, milieus should not be thought of according to a subject and object 
distinction, with material objects seen as inert tools for active subjects. Instead milieus 
can facilitate a conceptual ground for affect to be framed as the relational force through 
which individual experience unfolds. Whilst Anderson’s notion of atmosphere is non-
individualistic, Simondon’s concept of milieu is associated with a ‘living being’, and is at 
once singular, technological and geographical. Simondon offers the associated milieu as 
a conceptualisation of the development of individual psychological beings as both 
individual and collective, without either being seen as ontologically distinct. The 
individuation of beings is core to their endurance, which Simondon states “is possible 
because of the recurrence of causality in the environment which the technical being 
creates around itself, an environment which it influences and by which it is influenced. 
This environment, which is at the same time natural and technical, can be called the 
associated milieu” (Simondon, 2017: 49). The milieu is not an embryonic stage of 
becoming, which recedes once individuation takes place, but is continually present, 
moving in and through processes of individuation. The point Simondon is making is that 
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individuals do not exist outside of the milieu; the "individual never exists alone, it is only 
ever relative to the milieu associated with its existing" (Scott, 2014: 7).  
Individuals gain their internal consistency through the associated milieu, which is what 
differentiates milieu from atmosphere, as the former is focused on how individual living 
beings achieve an ‘internal consistency’ (what psychologists usually call an ‘identity’). 
This does not occur due to a form of internal logic (e.g. specific personality trait), but 
rather through processes of individuation that constitute the milieu. Simondon captures 
this when discussing technical objects, although the same principle applies to psychic 
objects, “[T]he only thing that counts is the exchange of energy and information… 
between the technical object and its milieu” (2017: 51). Simondon’s non-hylomorphic 
approach provides the impetus for him to recalibrate the concept of information, away 
from the classic Shannon and Weaver sign-signal model, towards a more agentic 
understanding in which “there is no datum or measure of information per se, only 
processes of information that resolve the disparate into systems of relationality and the 
individuals they comprise” (Toscano, 2006: 145). Information is not the passing of 'data' 
between established individuals but names the process of matter taking form in creative 
processes of movement of organism and milieu. Information is the process of 
materialisation that manifests as the ongoing interactions between individual and milieu 
(Clough, 2010).   
Information does not pertain to the internal elements of an individuating form, because 
the form is not self-organising through the informational processes of its constituent 
parts. Individuation is not autopoietic in this sense. This is because its metastable 
identity does not emerge through processes that are self-originating. There are 
similarities between individuation and autopoiesis, but the former is not taken to be an 
entity whose material existence as a distinct object in space and time emerges through 
the dynamics of the ‘internal’ elements through which it manifests. Individuation does 
not refer to a system per se, but rather to an un-bounded manifold of possible 
interactions. Not all are ‘present’ in the individual-milieu, awaiting form, but are 
emergent possibilities for future psychic and collective individuation. This is why the 
question of a stable identity defining an individual is so hard for Simondon to accept. If 
beings are always partially collective, then it is impossible for the future being of an 
individual to be reduced to its own being alone. It cannot remain stable in perpetuity, 
because individuation is always ‘open’ to new phases of becoming, which means 
individual beings can only be metastable. Moreover, as we will see the concept of 
affectivity provides a psychological element to the processes of individuation and 
metastability, which does not commonly feature in other relational concepts such as 
autopoiesis and assemblage.  
Simondon’s focus on phases of being and metastability means psychological subjects are 
always-already emerging with an associated milieu. Neither are static, but subject to 
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reconfiguration and recreation. Indeed, this is a necessity for the process philosophical 
approach Simondon advocates. Psychological analysis then has to always incorporate 
the milieu, and in doing so, is fundamentally relational. To understand psychological life, 
one has to analyse the ‘living being in context’. It is the relationship between the living 
being and associated milieu that is affective, for Simondon. Affectivity names the 
process of feeling more than one, because an individual’s being cannot be resolved 
entirely in the realm of interiority. It needs the milieu, and as such, comes to recognise 
that its perceived psychological independence does not emanate from it being an 
isolated being, but rather as connected and related to the world outside the borders of 
the body. As such, “the living being grows from both the inside and the outside, the 
entire content of its inner space is in ‘topological’ contact with the contents of exterior 
space” (Deleuze, 2001: 47). The subject-milieu relationship does not rule out influence 
from broader socio-political forces (e.g. capital, race, gender, sexuality). Indeed, all are 
possible constituents of present and future ‘subjects’. What the subject-milieu does is 
to render such forces applicable at the local level where psychological subjects emerge.  
Simondon’s theory of individuation links directly to Spinoza and Deleuze's concepts of 
affect, in relation to the notion of the individual being an unfinished product of relational 
processes involving ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’ elements. Individuation is always an active 
process of ‘bringing together’ two (or more) disparate elements. There is only difference 
for Simondon, no unity of identity. This means that a relation always exists between an 
individual attribute and the environment. Individuation is the process of continually 
making life from existing environment-element individuations. All we can do is analyse 
lines of individuation, aware that our interaction with them (as theorists and/or 
empiricists) will change them. This was highly influential for Deleuze, particularly his 
theory of difference in Difference and Repetition. Where Deleuze differs is in his use of 
difference and repetition to articulate transcendental empiricism (Sauvagnargues, 
2012), in which the concept of individuation is (re)framed through the notions of 
actuality and virtuality. The former being the emerging of an empirical object at a given 
time and the latter a virtual realm of potentiality. Simondon remains focused on the 
specificity of psychic and collective individuation, and the role of affectivity and 
emotivity therein.  
 
Affectivity and emotion 
The problem presented by Simondon’s philosophy of individuation is that it goes against 
common sense practice of perceiving oneself a discrete subject. This substantialist 
position takes an intrasubjective approach to manage psychological concerns, namely 
looking 'inside' for solutions to psychological problems. For Simondon, this is misguided, 
because it fails to address the psychosocial reality of being. A focus on the individual as 
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the defined unit of analysis does not recognise the reality that individuals do not exist 
outside of milieus. As Combes notes, "[A]ffective life thus shows us that we are not only 
individuals, that our being is not reducible to our individuated being" (2013: 31). 
Individual beings are ‘open’, in that individuation is always individual-milieu. To focus on 
the individual is a misplaced locationism, the analytic lens has to be widened to include 
the individuating ground of the milieu. Elizabeth Wilson’s (2010) analysis of the story of 
Deep Blue and the Chess Master Garry Kasparov is a useful example here:  
The Deep Blue computer gained worldwide notoriety when it defeated Kasparov. The 
argument made at the time was that Deep Blue developed greater intellectual capacities 
than Kasparov, namely that it could think better. Wilson’s claim though that the real 
reason Kasparov lost to Deep Mind was affective, because  
when he is at his most effective, he recruits his opponents into an 
affective intensity….The pertinent issue is not the emotion in 
Kasparov (Is he angry? Is he afraid?), as if he operates as an affective 
monad (as isolated talent); rather it is the emotional relationality 
between Kasparov and his opponent that governs (p. 16) 
Wilson directs us to consider the role of emotion in the space occupied by Kasparov and 
Deep Blue. The emotional character of the game is changed when Kasparov is faced with 
Deep Blue, rather than a human opponent. The “affective intensity” of the human vs 
human relation is reconfigured in the human vs machine scenario. What Wilson’s 
analysis does is to shift the analytic starting point from the idea of Kasparov and the 
machine as individuals to the game emerging from a context of emotional activity, of 
which Kasparov and Deep Blue are just two elements. It was not just the case that 
Kasparov was “emotionally underwhelmed” in terms of losing his emotional power 
when faced with a machine opponent, but that engaging with Deep Blue constituted a 
new phase of being with a different affective, and therefore, emotional potential. 
Kasparov is a key part of this but is not the only agent. When facing Deep Blue, the 
“affective circuitry” is changed. As Wilson notes, the question is not whether machine 
beating person is a line in the sand of technological advancement. What’s really at work 
is affective transformation, which changes the subject-milieu relationship. This change 
will be felt at both levels, it is not just the case the Kasparov is changed (i.e. weakened) 
by it, but the possibilities for individuation alter as a consequence of entering a new 
phase of being. Analysing at this level is more informative than viewing the event as a 
battle between competing individual information processors.  
The experience of individuation though is not straightforward, with Simondon framing 
the human experience of individuation as emerging through affectivity and emotivity. 
The influence on affectivity comes from Spinoza, in terms of Simondon's "interest in the 
details of how specific technical bodies have the power to affect and be affected" 
(Combes, 2013: 101). Simondon's affectivity is therefore central to the emergence of 
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individual psychic life. He states, “affectivity and emotivity, which constitute the 
resonance of being in relation to itself, and which link the individuated being to the 
preindividual reality that is linked to it, just like the tropistic or taxonomic unity and 
perception link it to its environment” (2009: 9). We should not claim psychic attributes 
as substances though, affect is not to be reified. Indeed, Simondon is keen not to think 
of a psychic individual as such, but rather psychic problems that drive individuation 
(which is psychic AND collective). Do not start analysis with the idea of the 'finished' 
individual being in mind, but rather think only of the conditions of its emergence 
(genesis) and ongoing metastability. Affectivity and emotivity become the functions of 
psychological being rather than substances "filling it" (Combes, 2013: 27). Affectivity 
acts as the "relational layer constituting the center of individuality" (Combes, 2013: 31). 
It is affectivity that puts “into communication that which is larger and that which is 
smaller than” us (Simondon, 2009: 9). Simondon considers affectivity as a problem at 
the centre of the human condition. Affectivity therefore holds an ontogenetic role, as it 
acts as the actual structuring movement of psychological life. If psychic life unfolds 
through individuating processes of becoming, it is affectivity that constitutes this 
becoming.  
A distinction between technical and psychic objects emerges through delineating the 
role of affectivity and emotivity. Simondon uses affectivity to critique the idea of psychic 
reality always being intra-individual. Instead, we need to be open to the pre-individual 
reality through which new interactions between individual and collective emerge. This 
is not easy though and presents a challenge in terms of everyday life. In realising the 
presence of pre-individual reality, individuals can often try to ‘internally’ solve the 
tension between recognising oneself as a coherent psychological individual while 
simultaneously carrying some ‘yet to be actualised’ exterior reality. Simondon names 
this an emotional process of anxiety (which is active not passive). Affectivity is 
consequently the fundamental inter-connectedness of individual and pre-individual in 
the formation of psychic being, and emotivity names the process of feeling this 
relationship as a tension for which one seeks an ‘internal’ (and therefore inadequate) 
solution. Affectivity is the structuring movement of life as it conditions becoming and 
being, and consequently the subject. Muriel Combes captures this nicely when she 
writes that affectivity “arises in us as a liaison between the relation of the individual to 
itself and its relation to the world” (p. 31). Emotivity becomes that which "modulates 
psychic life, while affection is what is modulated" (Scott, 2014, 71). A conceptual multi-
layering is at work in understanding psychological being. Emotion provides some sense 
of continuity to psychic being, albeit in a way that requires being in constant contact 
with the affective realm of preindividuation.  
Thus, affectivity “shows us that we are not only individuals, that our being is not 
reducible to our individuated being.” (Combes, 2013, p31). It is here that the third part 
of Simondon's individuation triptych emerges, namely transindividuation, which 
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explains the "systematic unity of the interior (psychic) individuation and the exterior 
(collective) individuation (2009: 8). Transindividuation designates a form of individuated 
being which is neither a manifestation of intra-individuality nor collective life, but rather 
part of a wider system of preindividuation, which relates to individuation and which is 
"capable of constituting a new problematic with its own metastability" (ibid). 
Transindividuality names the overarching reality of relationality upon which Simondon's 
philosophy of individuation is based. It defines the complexity of the operation of 
individuation as psychic and collective, and through emotion and affectivity. Simondon 
also refers to this as ‘emotive latency’, as emotion is latent until the transindividual 
relation takes hold through processes that are always-already collective. This means that 
emotion cannot be entirely reduced to the level of the individual, however personal it 
may feel, but is always the product of processes that are collective (Ellis & Tucker, 2015). 
 
Affective milieus and psychological subjects 
Where then does all this theorising leave us in relation to understanding critical 
psychological approaches to the psychological subject? I chose to address this in relation 
to the digital, given the ways data are coming to blur notions of individuality and 
collectivity, which are core to Simondon’s philosophy. We can acknowledge that digital 
media are present in many of the environments through which everyday life unfolds, 
and indeed, would potentially like to play an even larger role (e.g. current push to have 
digital voice assistants in the home - Amazon's Echo). Critics suggest this creates a 
pressure on psychological experience due to it being more difficult to avoid the 
monitoring, capture and storage of individual activity through digital technologies, e.g. 
tracking internet searches, capture of social media activity etc. (Harper et al, 2013). 
Indeed, a new form of surveillance of emotion (emotoveillance) has been coined 
(McStay, 2016). Critiques are largely based on the idea that digital media collect vast 
amounts of personal information, which provide considerable insight regarding people's 
thoughts and feelings. This information generates bulging databases of big technology 
companies, which can then be used 'against' us in terms of tailored advertising, mass 
surveillance, as well as more localised forms of voyeurism through social media (Ball, 
2014). While these critiques clearly speak to elements of life in the digital age, they are 
premised on a substantialist philosophy that renders pre-formed individuals as the 
originators of information. Simondon's philosophy relies on a more powerful idea of 
information, that frames it as "the condition of actualization” (2017: 155). Information 
is the agent of individuation through in-forming phases of being into metastable states. 
In this sense, information is an active element in the process of individuation, rather 
than a conduit for the transmission of internal thoughts and feelings from a discrete 
individual to a digital database.   
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These developments fit into wider claims that the digital is increasingly part of what 
makes us human (Horst & Miller, 2016). Often this development is seen as a threat, as 
if digital technologies are capable of eroding human values, of somehow taking control 
of human capacities, of shaping what we are and what we do (Stiegler, 2016). In a sense 
though, the underlying theory of psychology as ontogenetic does not change with regard 
to living in a digital age. We have always been collective, and digitality does not change 
this. My argument in this paper has been to frame a psychology of affect that is 
relational, motional and collective, drawn from Simondon, which speaks directly to 
critical psychological concerns to deliver theories of relationality that offer new 
understandings for psychology. Simondon’s theory of individuation is valuable because 
it conceptualises psyche and collective as always-already intertwined, and in doing so, 
widens the unit of analysis to consider the conditions in and through which individual 
and collective life unfold. In relation to living in increasingly digital environments, a focus 
on individuation encourages awareness of how we are shaped by phases of metastable 
being, and ever subject to individuation by future collectives. Addressing increased 
digitisation in this way can help to provide a more nuanced understanding of the reality 
of the multiple relations individuals have with digital technologies. Perhaps by attending 
closely to these new individuations, we can ensure that concerns about increased 
digitisation do not become frothy, but rather remain grounded in everyday individuating 
lives. Indeed, emotion helps here as it becomes a way of thinking the "collective at 
molecular level" (Combes, 2013: 52). 
The idea of the psychological subject as emerging and operating through affective 
milieus at the threshold of interiority and exteriority encourages us to develop a more 
expansive approach to the study of the kinds of psychological subject made possible in 
contemporary digitally mediated worlds. For instance, the increased focus on areas such 
as affective computer and artificial intelligence rely on individualistic notions of 
emotion, constituting them as individual states that can be identified and potentially 
manipulated by machines. So long as they continue to do so, they will fall short in their 
attempts to capture and predict emotional life. This critique exists in addition to those 
that claim that as digital technologies cannot feel emotion, it will always remain out of 
grasp, however encroaching on everyday life digital media become. My argument is that 
the individualistic approach does not enable an analysis of how we come to feel with 
technologies. An approach informed by Simondon’s psychology offers a way by which 
to potentially bridge existing positions, which become somewhat polarized between the 
individual ecologies of users of digital media, and the collective machines of digitisation, 
which are said to constitute the digital ‘side’ of contemporary life through data. We are 
individual beings, but we also carry something of the collective with us. 
Digital media are very good at exploiting the dual-aspect (individual AND collective) 
concept of the subject, e.g. the aggregation of individual data into ‘big data’, which is 
then used to feedback into individual’s digital activity, such as tailored advertising. 
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Concerns about increased digitization often rely on notions of bounded ‘data individuals’ 
whose privacy is under threat when data shared is deemed to remain the property of 
the individual it originated from. I take from Simondon a notion of the subject as a 
structuring movement of an ongoing point of liaison between interiority and exteriority. 
Exteriority and interiority do not relate to pre-existing domains of activity, but are series 
of intensities and sensations, which are themselves in movement. As such we do not 
experience objects, but rather movements. As David Scott notes, “our sensible reality is 
tropistic” (2014: 69). Affectivity defines this process, the connecting with the external 
world and rendering parts of it emotionally sensible. To return to Wilson’s example of 
Kasparov and Deep Blue, the problem Kasparov faced was how to process, and work 
with, the affective implications of playing against a machine opponent, not just to try to 
think better. The concepts of affectivity, milieu and individuation expand the unit of 
analysis to include the localised environment, and for this to be seen as affectively 
charged. This does not mean that affect is discharged in a universal manner. Rather, it 
is a way of designating the fundamental relationality of psychic and collective 
individuation. It directs analysis to the ways that subjects relate to, and become aware 
of, the connections with exteriority through which psychological life unfolds. Tensions 
that arise require relational solutions, they cannot be solved ‘internally’, as 
psychological subjects emerge through the structuring movement of psychic and 
collective individuation. To be simultaneously individual and collective, in an open and 
indeterminate way, is at the core of psychological life for Simondon. Coming to terms 
with this tension, and how it can be utilized by digital media, is core to understanding 
psychological life in a digital age.  
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